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CASES NOTED

lowed," a cause of action in favor of the depositor arises when unauthorized disclosure occurs. Moreover, the court's conception of the bank's
disclosure as a breach of an implied contract follows what appears to
be the most recently expounded judicial view.28 Consequently, this case,
along with the Peterson and Tournier decisions, may provide the nucleus
of the beginning of the end of an era of uncertainty.
STEPHEN

J.

KOLSKI

LIABILITY OF HARMLESS COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
TO THIRD PARTY
Plaintiff was injured by an explosion of a water repellent compound
which contained two percent "Tyzor HS," a harmless component developed by the defendant, E.I. DuPont, and ninety-eight percent Shell
Sol B. The compound was manufactured by a corporation not a party
to this action. Plaintiff sought recovery based upon negligence and strict
liability in tort. The jury found for the plaintiff only on the count alleging negligence. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, held, affirmed: The manufacturer of a harmless component is liable in negligence to a third party harmed by the end product
containing such component, based upon the prominent location of the
component manufacturer's trade-mark on the label and its active role
in producing and advertising the product. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and
Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969).
The landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' signaled
the close of an era in which the negligent manufacturer was protected
from third-party liability by the absence of a contractual relationship.
The Court of Appeals of New York, led by Justice Cardozo, replaced2
the burden of privity of contract imposed by Winterbottom v. Wright
with the more realistic test of foreseeable danger.' With the advent of
27. The difference in the theoretical basis of liability is not wholly academic, for damages
recoverable in tort may be more comprehensive than those recoverable in contract. The contractual theory, in other words, may not compensate a depositor for his total loss; see 22
Am. JUR. 2d Damages § 18 (1965). The bank in the instant case asserted that if a breach
of contract was stated, the complaint would nevertheless be insufficient for failure to allege
recoverable damages. The court disposed of the argument by citing 25 C.J.S. Damages
§ 50(e) (1966), and the cases cited therein, which suggest that when a breach of contract
results in the necessity to defend an action against third parties, recovery of attorney's fees
incurred in the prior litigation should be allowed in the action for breach of contract.
28. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) ; Tournier v.
Nat'l Provincial & Union Bank, [19241 1 K.B. 461.
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).

3. The court stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made . . . [and] there is . . . knowledge that the thing will
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the expanded scope of manufacturer's liability, however, came the dilemma of legally defining a manufacturer.
In an early 1900 case involving the sale of a poisonous drug where
the vendor was not the manufacturer but made it so appear on the label,
the court held that the mere representation of being the maker was
sufficient to render the druggist liable to the injured buyer.' The reasoning of the court was that the seller assumes responsibility for the
negligence of the actual manufacturer. This principle was later refined
so that when the druggist labels the medicine as his own, even though
he acknowledges that it was manufactured or prepared for him, he is
still liable as the ostensible manufacturer.'
Food distributors came under this same rule of liability.' In Burkhardt v. Armour & Co.,7 a distributor who labeled a food tin with the
company name but not that of the manufacturer was held liable to the injured consumer for the packer's negligence. The court's rationale was that
"the ordinary, reasonable person reading the label would have inferred
that Armour & Co., the distributor, was the packer of the product,"'
and would consequently have relied upon such assumption, thus invoking the principle of estoppel. Similarly, in Swift & Co. v. Blackwell,' the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:
even though the word "Distributors" appears on one side panel
of the label, when compared with the word "Swifts" (the name
of the distributor) elsewhere displayed, the advertisement as a
whole emphasizes Swift's connection with the goods and suggests
that the origin of the goods from such a source was a guaranty
of high quality.1"
The liability of the "apparent manufacturer" was not limited to
the area of food and drugs. In 1915 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held the vendor of an explosive oil stain liable for injury to the
purchaser where the stain was put out as his own, although manufacbe used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to
make it carefully.
217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
4. Willson v. Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 208 N.Y. 108, 101 N.E. 799 (1913).
5. Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931).
6. See Fleetwood v. Swift & Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 108 S.E. 909 (1921); Armour & Co.
v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9 A.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1939); Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss.
253, 164 So. 231 (1935); Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J.L. 421, 177 A. 120
(Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Walker v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 131 Tex. 57, 112 S.W.2d 170
(1938) (recovery in this case was under breach of implied warranty). But see Degouveia v.
H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936), in which the court
unrealistically held the dealer to be immune from liability where the term "packed for"
appeared on the label even though the name of the manufacturer did not so appear.
7. 115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 385 (1932).
8. Id. at 264, 161 A. at 391.
9. 84 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936).
10. Id. at 132.

CASES NOTED

tured by another." Later related cases have imposed negligence liability
upon distributors of a wide variety of items where the articles were sold
under their own name. 2 A few jurisdictions have adopted the contrary
view that the presence of the distributor's trade name on the label, absent
any mention of the manufacturer, is insufficient to establish responsibility
for the maker's negligence.' 3 In Cone v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical
Corp.,'4 the court, taking a compromise position between the two extremes
of liability and nonliability, would not unconditionally absolve the
retailer who sold a product as his own from all liability. It did refuse,
however, to allow recovery for those articles to be taken internally, not
constituting food, drink, or medicine, which were brought from a reputable manufacturer.15
The Restatement of Torts 6 is consistent with the trend of case
law,"7 in that it declares that "one who puts out as his own product a
chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as
though he were its manufacturer."' 8 However, the Restatement differs
in technique from the court-originated law. The ostensible manufacturer
incurs an inherent duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the
ultimate users of his misrepresented product under the Restatement,'9
while the courts use a vicarious liability theory whereby the distributor
who labels a product under his brand name acquires responsibility for
2
the negligent acts of the undisclosed maker. 1
A more recent development in the area of the liability of the nonmanufacturer for the defectively manufactured product has been to
confer a duty of care upon one who influences and participates in the
11. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N.E. 474 (1915). But see
Hamson v. Standard Grocery Co., 328 Mass. 263, 103 N.E.2d 233 (1952), in which the same
court did not impose liability on a wholesaler of a defective bottle where the label listed him
as the distributor but omitted both his brand name and that of the manufacturer.
12. Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962) (ladder); Green v.
Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (dynamite caps); Lill v.
Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Il. App. 328, 8 N.E.2d 714 (1937) (bed); Penn v. Inferno Mfg.
Co., 199 So.2d 210 (La. App. 1967) (eye glasses) ; Gordy v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
188 Miss. 313, 193 So. 29 (1940) (gasoline); Gittelson v. Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 188
Misc. 313, 42 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (toy) ; Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237
A.2d 593 (1968) (tire); S. Blickman, Inc. v. Chilton, 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
(stool).
13. Simmons v. Richardson Variety Stores, 51 Del. 80, 137 A.2d 747 (1957); Miller v.
Steinfeld, 174 App. Div. 337, 160 N.Y.S. 800 (1916).
14. 178 Miss. 816, 174 So. 554 (1937).
15. Id. But see Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936)
(exploding cigar).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRas § 400 (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT).
17. In fact, the following decisions have cited the RESTATEMENT as authority for holding
the nonmanufacturer who sells a product as his own liable in negligence: Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Morris, 273 Ala. 218, 136 So.2d 883 (1962) ; Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark.
630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 237 A.2d 593 (1968)
Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 13 Wis. 2d 173, 108 N.W.2d 149 (1961).
18. RESTATEMENT § 400.

19. Id. at comment c.
20. E.g., Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J.L. 421, 177 A. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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creation of such goods. In Bathory v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co.,"'
liability was extended to the distributor who was not the maker of the
dangerous item where the functions of manufacturing and selling were
part of one integrated operation. The distributor took an active interest
in the chain of production and could not avoid responsibility by asserting
that he was unaware of the manufacturing stage.2 2 The principle of
law, as expressed in Carter v. Yardley & Co.,23 is that:
One who controls a thing that is dangerous in its nature or is in
a dangerous condition, either to his knowledge or as a result
of his want of reasonable care in manufacture or inspection,
who deals with or disposes of that thing in a way that he foresees or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to foresee will
probably carry that thing into contact with some person who will
probably be ignorant of the danger owes a legal duty to every
such person to use reasonable care to prevent injury to him."'
The decision reached in the instant case is not as unusual as the
method used to arrive at that result. The law was subtly reshaped to
fit the situation facing the court. The liability of one who represented
a product as his own was extended to the manufacturer of a harmless
component, whereas prior to the case at bar liability had only been
found with regard to distributors and retailers of the finished product. 5
A further deviation from precedent is the fact that the name of the true
manufacturer was included on the label, although it was not as readily
identifiable as the word "DuPont." 26
The court did adopt the fundamental rule established in earlier
cases that the total perspective of the label was to be examined to determine if the casual purchaser would reasonably believe the chemical compound to be DuPont's. 27 The court did not take the next logical step,
however, and impute the manufacturer's negligence to DuPont, the component supplier; instead, it held that DuPont owed a duty to test the
product, to determine the adequacy of the label warning, and to evaluate
the product's safety, irrespective of the maker's negligent acts.2 8
21. 306 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1962).

22. Id. at 28, 29. The court also based recovery upon misrepresentation as defined in
RESTATEMENT § 400.

23. 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). The liability of the distributor who represents
a good as his own was not the main issue in the case.
24. Id. at 96, 64 N.E.2d at 696.
25. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
26. The court pointed out that the word "DuPont" stood out broadly in "large black
letters against a clear yellow background at the center of the container" while "Wilmington
Chemical Corporation" tended to blend into the beige background. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 371, 372 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. See Swift & Co. v. Blackwell, 84 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936) ; Burkhardt v. Armour &
Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 385 (1932).
28. Ironically, the court has indirectly accepted the view professed in RESTATEMENT
§ 400 at comment c, which it had earlier dogmatically excluded from consideration as irrelevant, since it only applied to strict liability cases. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 372 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969). A thorough examination of prior law on
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Although the main emphasis of the opinion in DuPont focused on
the impression conveyed by the design of the label, the underlying
justification for the court's conclusion lies in the defendant's active
role in the development and distribution of the end product.
It [the defendant] counseled and advised [Wilmington Chemical Corp.] concerning the proper formula to be used in the
compound; it contacted the other component supplier. .

.

. It

conducted quality control tests on the end product. It retained
the right to make the ultimate decision as to the label on the
product, and it dictated the appropriate advertising methods. 9
DuPont maintained control over the product beyond the routine act of
supplying the component---control to such an extent that it was indefensible to disclaim a duty of care by proposing ignorance of the dangerous condition of the repellent. Unfortunately, the court gave only
secondary importance to this theory of liability.
In the opinion of this writer, the court was presented with an opportunity to clarify and delineate the law of negligence as it relates to
the component manufacturer, but, in the end, it succeeded only in confusing the issues. The critical question of whether liability is dependent
upon both deceptive labeling and control over the total product picture
or just one of them was left unresolved. Nor did the court indicate the
amount of participation, if liability was based on the control factor alone,
necessary to impose a duty on the manufacturer of the component. One
redeeming facet of this legal ambiguity, however, is that component
suppliers will share the uncertainty of the future application of the
court's decision and require more stringent and definitive assurances of
the safety of a finished product that acknowledges their contribution on
the label.
EDWARD I. STERNLIEB
point would have revealed the prominent role which RESTATEMENT § 400 has taken in negligence actions. See note 17 supra.
29. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. See Bathory v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 306 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1962); Carter
v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).

